We investigate the relationship between economic deregulation, skill upgrading, and wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s in India. We use a unique dataset on India's industrial licensing regime to test whether industrial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s played a role in generating demand for skilled workers and in widening the skill-wage gap. We also examine whether or not skilled workers benefited from industrial deregulation, capital-, and output-skill complementarities after the implementation of substantial trade and investment liberalization in 1991. We identify two main channels through which industrial delicensing affects the demand for skills and wage inequality: capital-and output-skill complementarities. Our results indicate that capital-and output-skill complementarities existed for firms in all industries. These complementarities were, however, stronger in delicensed industries both before and after 1991. The exception is output-skill complementarities with respect to the skill premium, where delicensing decreased these complementarities both before and and after 1991. The contribution of industrial delicensing to both types of complementarities was considerably higher during the 1980s and much smaller after 1991. These results suggest that industrial delicensing benefited skilled labor via capital-and output-skill complementarities before India liberalized trade and investment. Thus, much of the increase in the demand for and returns to skill as a result of capital-and output-skill complementarities, can be attributed to domestic rather than external sector reforms in India.
Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Indian labor market experienced two dramatic changes. First, there was a considerable widening of the skill wage gap, as shown in Figures 1 (average nominal wages) and 2 (skill premium). Figure 1 shows the average nominal wages of whiteand blue-collar workers between 1980-81 and 1994-95. 1 The average wage of white-collar or skilled workers is always higher than those of blue-collar or unskilled workers. Further, the divergence between these wages began during the mid-1980s and increased over time, especially after 1991. The skill premium, which we define as the ratio of the average whiteand blue-collar wage rates, declined during the early 1980s, remained relatively stable until the late 1980s, and rose considerably after 1991. The second change that occured in the Indian labor market during this period was a large increase in the demand for skilled labor. As shown in Figure 3 , (wagebill and employment shares of white-collar workers) there was a gradual increase in the share of the wagebill going to white-collar workers as well as in the share of white-collar workers employed by firms during the 1980s. After 1991, the wagebill and employment shares of white-collar workers rose sharply.
Together, Figures 1-3 reveal an interesting feature of India's labor market during the mid-1980s and early 1990s -that the employment share of white-collar workers rose simultaneously with the skill premium. Since the 1980s and 1990s also mark a period of widespread economic reforms in India, it is reasonable to expect that these reforms may have played a role in skill upgrading and wage inequality. Domestic sector reforms, which consisted of industrial deregulation, began during the mid-1980s and continued after 1991. 2 External sector reforms consisted of the liberalization of trade and foreign investment and began in July 1991.
Industrial deregulation consisted of industrial delicensing reforms for certain industries during the 1980s and 1990s. Delicensing meant freedom from constraints on output, inputs, technology, and location as well as free entry into delincensed industries. Freedom from these constraints allowed firms to take advantage of economies of scale, more efficient input combinations, and new technology. Further, greater domestic competition as a result of free entry into delicensed industries provided firms with incentives to innovate, increase productivity, and improve product quality. If output-, capital-, and technology-skill complementarities exist, we would observe skill upgrading and increased wage inequality as a result of industrial deregulation, ceteris paribus. External sector reforms, which consisted of trade and investment liberalization, would have a similar effect on skilled labor by increasing foreign competition for domestic firms and providing them with additional incentives to innovate, increase productivity, and improve product quality. Again, in the presence of output-, capital-, and technology-skill complementarities, we would observe increases in the demand for skilled labor and a widening of the skill-wage-gap.
A large body of literature has established a link between external sector reforms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality in India and other developing countries (Attanasio et al. 2004 , Cragg & Epelbaum 1996 , Feenstra & Hanson 1996 , 1997 , Gorg & Strobl 2002 , Hanson 2003 , Harrison & Hanson 1999 , Pavcnik 2003 , Verhoogen 2004 . For the case of India, Berman et al. (2005) , Chamarbagwala (2006) , Kumar & Mishra (2005) , Dutta (2005) all examine the relationship between trade liberalization, skill upgrading, and wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. While these studies provide valuable insights into the relationship between external sector reforms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality, they don't allow for a link between domestic sector reforms and the demand for and return to skills. Berman et al. (2005) use Indian industry-level data to examine the relationship between output, capital, trade, and skill, but do not allow for a link between industrial deregulation and skill. Sharma (2006) incorporates domestic deregulation in an analysis of firm behavior and outcomes and provides evidence that domestic deregulation contributed to productivity gains among Indian firms, though it does not address the effect of domestic sector reforms on skill upgrading and wage inequality. Our work builds on Berman et al. (2005) and Sharma (2006) by allowing for industrial deregulation as well as external sector reforms to influence skill upgrading and wage inequality using firm-level data for India.
Our primary contribution is to investigate the relationship between domestic sector reforms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality in India. Incorporating domestic sector reforms, which consisted of industrial deregulation, in an analysis of the demand for and return to skills is particularly important for the case of India. None of the previous studies on India's labor market control for the changes in the 1980s and hence may provide biased estimates of the impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading and wage inequality. Table 1 brings forward three important points that challenge the predictions of other studies on India. First, the chronology of reforms was such that industrial deregulation began during the mid-1980s and therefore well before the external sector reforms were implemented in July 1991. Thus, industrial deregulation may have changed the domestic manufacturing environment during the 1980s and 1990s, which may have, in turn, affected the ability and incentives of Indian firms to respond to trade and investment liberalization after 1991. Second, the industrial delicensing reforms of the 1980s were quite significant with respect to the percentage of manufacturing output that they affected. Cumulatively, 23% of output and almost 23% of employment had been delicensed by 1990. These two points suggest that ignoring pre-1991 changes in the licensing regime may provide misleading and biased estimates of the impact of the 1991 reforms. Third, de-licensing in 1991 was not "across the board" as is the common assumption in most studies. In fact, 16% of manufacturing output and 10% of employment were still under compulsory licensing post-1991. Some of these industries were gradually delicensed in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, studies that ignore the actual chronology of industrial deregulation post-1991 may overstate the impact of the 1991 reforms.
Our results identify two main channels through which industrial delicensing affects the demand for skills and wage inequality: capital-and output-skill complementarities. We find that capital-and output-skill complementarities existed for firms in all industries. These complementarities were, however, stronger in delicensed industries both before and after 1991. With respect to the skill premium, delicensing decreased output-skill complementarities during both periods. Industrial delicensing contributed substantially to both capital-and outputskill complementarities during the 1980s. However, the contribution of delicensing to these complementarities was negligible during the post-1991 period. Our results suggest that industrial delicensing benefited skilled labor via capital-and output-skill complementarities before India liberalized trade and investment. Thus, much of the increase in the demand for and returns to skill as a result of capital-and output-skill complementarities, can be attributed to domestic rather than external sector reforms in India. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the domestic and external sector reforms during the 1980s and 1990s in India. Section 3 summarizes the mechanisms through which skill upgrading and wage inequality can be affected by domestic and external sector reforms. Section 4 describes our data, estimation, adn identification strategy. We discuss our results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Domestic and External Sector Reforms
Even though India's mixed economy framework mandated a role for private enterprise, the government believed it was necessary to provide incentives to private firms to invest in desirable industries and locations. Industrial licensing therefore evolved as a method for the Indian government to to control private enterprise in India. 3 A license was a document that permitted a firm to begin or continue production in an industry and was issued by the Ministry of Industry in New Delhi.
The licensing regime controlled entry into an industry and hence the amount of competition faced by a firm. The most important concern for the licensing committee while debating a particular case was the "demand-supply situation" of the good -if it was felt that there was enough existing capacity to satisfy projected demand then the application was rejected, irrespective of the quality of the proposed good and the nature and productivity of the technology that it proposed to use. Another important facet was the type of the good. There was a disdain for variety among policy-makers of the time and competition was thought to be wasteful. Import and foreign exchange requirements were also important considerations and a large number of applications were rejected because they required "too" much foreign exchange. Thus, new projects were not assessed on the merit of their efficiency, productivity, or quality (Das 2000) .
A license also specified the amount of output that a firm could produce. This was conditional on the proposed location of the project and permission was required to change the location of production. The exact nature of the product was also specified and either permission or a new license was needed to change the product mix. A firm's inputs and technology, though not specified on the license, were also restricted. This is because the most crucial raw materials -steel, cement, coal, fuel, and furnace oil -as well as licenses to import inputsincluding machinery and equipment -were controlled by the government with firms receiving annual allotments of these inputs for production. In fact, licensing requirements were implemented primarily through the restricted allocation of these inputs to the firm. Based on the specified output limit on its license, every firm was alotted a fixed amount of these inputs annually. Thus, it was difficult if not impossible for an entrepreneur to produce over the specified output limit on his license.
Policy makers began realizing the crippling effect of the licensing regime on the Indian economy during the 1960s and 1970s and several ad hoc measures were implemented during this period. 4 However, it was only during the 1980s that the government took substantial steps in relaxing the licensing regime by "delicensing" certain industries. Table 1 shows the percentage of manufacturing and factory output and value added that was delicensed during the 1980s and 1990s. While this piece-meal approach to reforming industrial policy continued through the 1980s, the Indian economy faced a severe balance of payment crisis in July 1991 and was forced to take loans from international organizations. It was at this time that the biggest delicensing episode occurred, under pressure from these organizations. Almost all industrial licensing was removed, other than for 16% of manufacturing output.
Along with this, there were massive external sector reforms in 1991, which consisted of trade and investment liberalization. The trade policy reforms aimed at liberalizing and promoting both exports and imports. As a result of lower tariffs, elimination of quotas and import license requirements, and liberalization of technology imports, total exports and imports increased dramatically during the 1990s. Exports were liberalized via the abolition of export subsidies and controls while the liberalization of imports was implemented via a rapid reduction in tariff rates and the abolition of licensing and quantitative restrictions on most imports except consumer goods. The average ad valorem tariff rate fell from 125% in 1990 to 40% in 1999. Besides lower tariffs, non-tariff barriers were reduced by eliminating quantitative restrictions -quotas and import licensing requirements -particularly on capital and intermediate goods. In addition, technology imports were liberalized by eliminating technology license requirements. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was liberalized to a limited extent, resulting in an increase of FDI from $233 million to $3.3 billion during the 1990s. Besides these reforms, the rupee was devalued by 22% (from Rs. 21.20 to Rs. 25.80 per U.S. dollar). The sheer scale and scope of the reforms were so large that this reform episode has been the one that has caught the attention of policy-makers and researchers alike.
The licensing regime affected firm-level productivity and costs through its control on both the firm's textitability and incentives to innovate, reduce costs, use efficient input combinations, adopt new technology, and exploit economies of scale. Direct controls on outputs and inputs affected firms' abilities whereas indirect control of entry affected firms' incentives. Even if direct controls were not fully implemented due to corruption, the effect of indirect controls on incentives was substantial. Licensing restricted entry into most sectors and created artificial monopolies and oligopolies. The average four-firm concentration ratio in Indian manufacturing in 1981 was 54% compared to 32% for the US in 1977. Even among developing countries, India's concentration ratio was closer to Poland's (65% in 1988) rather than Brazil's (32% in 1988).
Mechanisms of Skill Upgrading and Increased Wage Inequality
Given the extent of India's licensing regime, it is reasonable to expect that industrial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s may have played a role in raisng the demand for and returns to skill in the country. We explore several hypotheses which explain the mechanisms through which domestic and external sector reforms may affect skills in less developed countries (LDCs). Hypotheses I and II relate both domestic and external sector reforms to the demand for and returns to skill in LDCs. Hypotheses III and IV concern only external sector reforms -that is, trade and investment liberalization.
The first hypothesis (Hypothesis I) relates skill-biased change to increased demand for skilled labor and a rising skill premium. According to this hypothesis, domestic and external sector reforms increase the degree of competition faced by firms as a result of entry of domestic firms as well as from foreign firms. Increased competition provides incentives for firms to become more productive -that is, exploit economies of scale, utilize more efficient input combinations, and adopt new technology. If these changes are complementary to skilled labor, economic liberalization should result in skill upgrading and increased wage inequality. In other words, in the presence of output-, capital-, and technology-skill complementarities, we should observe skill upgrading and a widening skill-wage-gap after economic deregulation. The existing literature focuses solely on trade liberalization. Wood (1995) argues that trade liberalization results in "defensive innovation" -that is, greater competition from foreign firms may induce domestic firms in LDCs to either engage in R&D or to adopt new and advanced technologies in order to secure their market share in the domestic and international markets. Because of technology-skill complementarities, adoption of modern technologies raises the demand for and returns to skilled labor. Acemoglu (2003) describes how, as the result of trade liberalization in LDCs, increased capital goods imports can lead to greater demand for skilled workers as a result of capital-skill complementarities, thus increasing the skill-premium. Empirical support for this hypothesis is found by Attanasio et al. (2004) for Colombia and by Harrison & Hanson (1999) for the case of Mexico. Gorg & Strobl (2002) find an increase in the relative wages of skilled labor in Ghana, brought about by skill-biased technological change induced through imports of technology-intensive capital goods or export activity. However, Pavcnik (2003) rejects this hypothesis for Chilean plants. Berman et al. (2005) find evidence of output-and capital-skill complementarities in Indian industries during the 1980s and 1990s, though they exclude any potential effect of industrial deregulation on skill upgrading and wage inequality.
Quality-upgrading by firms, as a result of greater competition, is the second hypothesis (Hypothesis II). The basic argument is that domestic and external sector liberalization may induce a quality upgrading of firms, where quality refers to either firm productivity or product quality. Verhoogen (2004) finds strong support for this hypothesis for the case of Mexico where greater exports as a result of the peso crisis resulted in better quality products being produced by exporters. Because higher quality products require a higher proportion of skilled workers, the relative demand for and returns to skilled labor increased. For India, Sharma (2006) finds that firms that experienced delicensing experienced higher productivity before and after the countrys external sector reforms of 1991 but does not examine the relationship between reforms and skills. If higher firm-level productivity is complementary to skilled labor, we would expect that there would be skill upgrading as well as higher returns to skilled labor among Indian firms.
The third hypothesis (Hypothesis III) is based on the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and relates solely to external sector reforms in trade. The SS theorem predicts that trade liberalization will raise the demand for and returns to the abundant factor of production -that is, unskilled labor in most LDCs. Even though at first glance this theorem predicts a decrease in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in LDCs, on closer inspection it shows that as protective import tariffs, quotas, and licenses are removed, the price of formerly protected goods will fall. By the SS Theorem, a decrease in the relative price of a good will decrease the relative price of the factor used intensively in the production of that good and increase the relative price of other factors. Since in many LDCs -namely Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Morocco -the most protected sectors were those that were intensive in unskilled labor, the SS theorem predicts that trade liberalization in these countries should lower unskilled wages. Thus, an increased demand for skilled labor and a widening skill-wage-gap support the predictions of the SS theorem in these countries. India, on the other hand, had its highest protection levels -both, tariff and non-tariff barriers -in human-and physical-capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, the rising demand for and returns to skilled labor in India contradict the predictions of the SS theorem for the country -which are an increase in the demand for and returns to unskilled labor and an expansion of unskilled-labor-intensive sectors.
Global production sharing or outsourcing, which relates solely to external sector reforms in investment, is the fourth hypothesis (Hypothesis IV) that has been provided to explain the rising skill premium and demand for skilled labor in LDCs. Feenstra & Hanson (1996) and Feenstra & Hanson (2003) argue that trade and investment liberalization on the part of LDCs allows developed countries (DCs) to transfer the production of intermediate goods and services to LDCs. For LDCs these activities are skill-intensive, which results in a greater demand for and returns to skilled labor. Therefore, external sector reforms that promote trade in manufactures and services and those that attract foreign direct investment can benefit skilled workers in LDCs. Feenstra & Hanson (1997) find empirical support for this hypothesis for the case of Mexico.
Data, Estimation, and Identification Strategy

Empirical Analysis
Our data comes from two sources. In order to measure the extent of industrial deregulation faced by a firm, we have collected a unique and detailed data set of industrial policy in India from the 1970s onwards. Using this data, we can identify which four-digit industry underwent reform -that is, freedom from licensing requirements -in each year from 1970 until 1990. The main source of this data was internal government publications and notifications issued to administrative ministries. Some commonly available publications like the Economic Survey were also used. The second source of data is firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), for the years 1980-81 until 1994-95. The survey covers all factories registered under the Factories Act of 1948 and only covers the formal sector in Indian manufacturing. 5 We begin by investigating the relationship between domestic sector reforms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality prior to the 1991 external sector reforms. In doing so, we allow for capital-and output-skill complementarities to exist. The translog production function (Berman et al. 1994) provides the theoretical motivation for our estimation equation. To focus on the pre-1991 relationship between industrial delicensing and skills, we restrict our sample to only include the period before the external sector reforms of July 1991. Thus, we only include firms during the period 1980-81 to 1990-91 and estimate the following equation.
Here Y ijts is a measure of the relative demand for skilled labor or the skill premium for firm i producing in industry j located in state s in year t. We use 2 alternate measures of the relative demand for skilled labor -that is, the proportion of white-collar workers employed by the firm and the firm's wagebill share of white-collar workers. The skill premium is measured as the ratio of the white-collar wage rate to the blue-collar wage rate. White-and blue-collar workers are non-production and production workers respectively. The employment share of whitecollar workers is defined as is the natural log of the firm's capital-output ratio whereas ln (O jt ) is the natural log of the firm's output. K jt is measured as the capital stock of the firm, which is defined as the average of firm j's fixed capital over year t. 6 Output is measured as firm j's real output in year t with industry-specific deflators. For Equation 1 and all subsequent regressions, we estimate robust standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level.
Summary statistics of our key variables are presented in Table 2 for three important sub periods -1980-81 to 1983-84, 1984-85 to 1990-91, and 1991-92 to 1994-95 . The period 1980-83 is pre-reform with no industrial or external sector policy changes. During 1984-90 there was only industrial deregulation and the 1991-94 period was characterized by both industrial deregulation and external sector reforms. There is a steady rise in the average employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers and in the average skill premium from one period to the next. The average capital-output ratio as well as the average output level are also increasing considerably over this time period.
Identification
The coefficient β 1 in Equation 1 may provide biased and inconsistent estimates of the effect of industrial delicensing on skill upgrading and wage inequality due to an omitted variable bias. Our main explanatory variable, Dereg jt , varies at the 4-digit industry-level of the National Industrial Classification (NIC). Political economy factors like political affiliation and lobbying power, also at the industry-level, may determine whether or not industry j gets delicensed in any given year t. If political power is also concentrated among highly skilled industries, then there may be a spurious correlation between industrial deregulation and the demand for and return to skilled labor, which would bias our estimate of β 1 . In order to control for unobservables at the industry-level, we include 4-digit industry fixed effects, δ j . We also include year (γ t ) and state-level (λ s ) fixed effects to control for year-and state-specific unobservables. Equation 2 includes industry, year, and state fixed effects.
The nature of industrial delicensing in India provides yet another reason why β 1 may be biased. There may be a potential reverse causation between skill upgrading or wage inequality and industrial delicensing. The reforms of the 1980s have been characterized by some as "reforms by stealth". There was no consensus for economic reforms in the 1980s. More importantly, it is clear from policy documents that the government was eager to portray the changes of the 1980s as a continuation of the existing system even though these reforms introduced dramatic changes that veered away from the high-regulation, socialist paradigm that had been operating since the 1950s. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the Indian government chose industries for deregulation based on certain industry-specific characteristics that either raised the chances of success of the reforms or that minimized social costs in case of failure. For example, the government may have chosen to delicense more skill-intensive industries if government officials expected skill-intensity to enhance the success of the reforms or to minimize the employment effects of delicensing. In this case, β 1 will not measure the effect of industrial delicensing on skills. Rather, it will capture the selection of skill-intensive industries into delicensing. While industry fixed effects may control for some industry-specific characteristics that determined selection into delicensing, in order to get reliable estimates we need within-industry variation in our delicensing measure.
In order to identify the effect of industrial deregulation on skill upgrading and wage inequality, we therefore interact the delicensing indicator with the capital-output ratio and output level of a firm. Not only does this provide us with within-industry variation, but it also allows us to examine the indirect effect of deregulation on skills via capital-and output-skill complementarities. We thus identify only the indirect effect of industrial deregulation -that is, the interaction of deregulation with the capital-output ratio and output level of a firm -and not the direct effect of industrial delicensing on skills.
Our identification strategy coincides closely with an important institutional feature of the licensing regime in India -there was an important size-based difference in the application of licensing provisions. In particular, firms that had assets in plant, machinery, land, and building less than a threshhold value were exempt from industrial licensing requirements. A firm's capital-output ratio and output level is negatively correlated with a firm's exemption status. Thus, firms with a higher capital-output ratio and output level were more likely to have assets over the threshhold value and were therefore more likely to be under the burden of licensing provisions. Table 3 presents summary statistics of our key variables for firms that were not exempt from industrial licensing (columns (2) and (3)) and for firms that were exempt from licensing requirements (columns (4) and (5)). In all three periods, firms that were not exempt from licensing had approximately three times the average capital-output ratio compared to firms that were exempt from licensing. The average output level in nonexempt firms was sustantially larger than that in exempt firms. Moreover, in each period, the average employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers was higher in firms that were not exempt from licensing. During the latter two periods, the average skill premium was also higher in non-exempt firms.
Equation 3 includes interactions of the capital-output ratio and output level of a firm with our industrial delicensing measure. This specification is equivalent to a difference-in-differences estimation.
Finally, we examine whether the effects of industrial deregulation on skills were different during the pre-and post-1991 periods. To do so, we estimate Equation 4, which is equivalent to a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation procedure.
In Equation 4 we use a different measure of industrial deregulation. Dereg80 j is an indicator that takes a value of one if industry j was delicensed in any year during the 1980s and zero otherwise. We use this alternate measure of industrial delicensing in order to isolate the impact of delicensing during the 1980s from the effects of the post-1991 reforms. As described in Section 2, the post-1991 reforms consisted of industrial delicensing as well as trade and investment liberalization. Equation 4 therefore allows us to examine the effect of pre-1991 industrial delicensing on skills and how firms that were delicensed during the 1980s performed, with respect to skill upgrading and wage inequality, both before and after the 1991 reforms.
In all regressions we include an indicator of whether the firm is a factory or not 7 We also include indicators for the type of ownership and organization of a firm. For ownership structure, we include two indicators -one for a joint sector firm and the other for a firm in the private sector. The omitted group consists of firms in the public sector. We include two indicators to capture overall differences in organization structure -one for a public or private limited company and the other for a co-operative society. The omitted group consists of firms that are individual proprietorships or partnerships. 8
Results
Results for the Pre-1991 Period
We present results of estimating Equation 2 in Table 4 , which provides evidence of both capital-and output-skill complementarities. A higher capital-output ratio as well as higher output levels are associated with a larger employment (columns (3) and (4)) and wagebill (columns (5) and (6)) share of white collar workers as well as with a higher skill premium (columns (7) and (8)). A 1% increase in the capital-output ratio is associated with a 1.2 and 1.7 percentage point increase in the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers. Output-skill complementarities are stronger -a 1% increase in the output level is associated with a 2.2 and 3.4 percentage point increase in the employment and wagebill shares of whitecollar workers. 9 There is a stronger relationship between the skill premium and the capitaloutput ratio and output level of a firm. An increase of 2.2 and 4.0 percentage points in the skill premium is associated with a 1% increase in the capital-output ratio and output level, respectively. While there is a positive and significant relationship between the capital-output ratio and output level with respect to the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers, the coefficient estimates of Dereg cannot be identified specifically as the effect of industrial delicensing on these measures.
In order to control for industry selection into delicensing based on its skill-intensity, we need within-industry variation in our delicensing measure. Interacting our delicensing measure with the capital-output ratio and output level of a firm provides within-industry variation and allows us to identify any effect of industrial delicensing on skill upgrading and wage inequality via capital-and output-skill complementarities. Table 5 presents coefficients and robust standard errors from estimating Equation 3. Capital-and output-skill complementarities remain robust across all industries, both licensed and delicensed.
The coefficent estimate of Dereg can be interpreted as changes in skill upgrading and wage inequality between industries as a result of industrial deregulation. There appears to be substantial skill downgrading between industries as a result of industrial deregulation during the 1980s in India -the coefficient estimates show a 9.4 and 10.1 percentage point decline in the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers as a result of industrial deregulation. These coefficient estimates may be contaminated as a result of selection into industrial delicensing based on skill-intensity or other characteristics and only the within-industry effects of delicensing via capital-and output-skill complementarities can be identified. Table 6 presents coefficient and F-test statistics in the first panel and summarizes the degree of capital-and output-skill complementarities for firms in all industries (that is, both licensed and delicensed industries) and those in only delicensed industries in the second panel. The coefficient estimates of Equation 3 suggest that an increase of 8% in the average capitaloutput ratio between 1980-81 and 1990-91 is associated with an 8.8 and 12 percentage point rise in the employment share of white-collar workers for firms in all and delicensed industries, respectively. For the wagebill share of white-collar workers, these figures are 13.6 and 17.6 percentage points for firms in all and delicensed industries, respectively. The increases in the skill premium are 17.6 and 23.2 percentage points respectively fro firms in all and delicensed industries. Thus, industrial deregulation strengthened capital-skill complementarities with respect to the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers as well as the skill premium within industries during the 1980s in India.
The contribution of industrial delicensing to output-skill complementarities is even larger. An increase of 10.7% in the average output level between 1980-81 and 1990-91 is associated with a 22.5 and 32.1 percentage point increase in the employment share of white-collar workers for firms in all and delicensed industries, respectively. For the wagebill share of white-collar workers there is a 35.3 and 44.9 percentage point increase for firms in all and delicensed industries, respectively. However, the skill premium increased more for firms in all (43.9 percentage points) than in delicensed (36.4 percentage points) industries. Thus, while industrial delicensing during the 1980s strengthened output-skill complementarities with respect to the relative demand for skilled labor within industries, it weakened it for the relative return to skilled labor. Table 7 presents coefficients and robust standard errors from estimating Equation 4 which allows us to examine the contribution of industrial delicensing to capital-and output-skill complementarities both before and after 1991. Tables 8 and 9 present coefficient and F-test statistics in the first panel and summarize the degree of capital-and output-skill complementarities for firms all and delicensed industries in the second panel for the pre-and post-1991 periods, respectively. The degree of capital-and output-skill complementarites for firms in all and delicensed industries during the pre-1991 period are almost identical to those reported in Table 6 . We therefore focus on comparing the extent of complementarities before and after 1991.
Results for the Pre-and Post-1991 Period
Two observations are striking in comparing capital-and output-skill complementarities before and after 1991. First, the degree of capital-and output-skill complementarities are lower for firms in all as well as delicensed industries in the post-1991 period compared to the pre-1991 period. This is surprising given the extensive external sector reforms that were implemented in 1991. Second, the difference in complementarities among firms in all and delicensed industries is large during the pre-1991 period and small post-1991. Thus, industrial delicensing contributed little to the relative demand for and return to skilled labor via capitaland output-skill complementarities post-1991.
Conclusion
In this paper we use disaggregated data on firm-level employment as well as on industrial deregulation to analyze a puzzling finding. Nearly 15 years after major industrial and trade reforms took place in India, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has risen contrary to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. One possible explanation of this might be that increased competition may force firms to innovate, to upgrade their technology and/or to increase their output levels to take advantage of economies of scale, leading to an increase in the demand for skilled labor. Using data spanning industrial de-regulation in the 1980s as well as the major trade reforms of the 1990s we analyze the behaviour of wage bill share of skilled workers, the employment share of skilled workers and the skill premium (ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage). The chronology of Indian reforms (with piece-meal industrial de-regulation in the 1980s and external sector reforms in the 1990s) allows us to seperate out the effects of domestic and external reforms.
We find that for the 1980s capital-skill and output-skill complementarities exist for firms in all industries, but are stronger in industries that were de-licensed with respect to wage bill and employment-shares of skilled workers. However, output-skill complementarities are weaker with respect to skill premium in de-delicensed industries. Strikingly, there seems to be a decline in the extent of the complementarities in the years immediately following the massive reforms of 1991.
These regression results as well simple diagrammatic analysis confirm that an increasing trend in the relative demand for skilled workers preceeded the external sector reforms of 1991 and that industrial de-regulation in India may have had a role to play. Once micro-economic constraints were lifted from the firms, they could produce more output and take advantage of economies of scale. Further, de-licensing also lead to productivity increases as documented in Sharma(2006) . Both the above circumstances would encourage firms to hire more skilled workers but it is not surprising that output plays an important role. With the lifting of output constraints (with de-licensing) an engineer would pay for himself with the increase in productivity and profits his hire generated. Pre-reform, the extra output generated by the hire of the engineer could not be sold in the market and hence, it was not worth while to hire one.
The reason for the decline in the strength of the complementarities in the 1990s could lie in the short time span of the data -firms may take time to adjust to such major policy changes. Also, our measure of external sector reforms is a simple time dummy variable and this may conceal a large variety of responses. For example, firms in external-oriented sectors or in sectors which recieved the lowest tariffs would have stronger complementarities. Further research, with industry-level trade and foreign investment data might provide an answer. To compute these figures we use delicensing and firm-level data at the 4-digit level of the National Industrial Classification (NIC). 1980-81 to 1983-84 1984-85 to 1990-91 1991-92 to 1994- Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. Real output is in thousands of 1993-94 Rupees. Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
The omitted year is 1980-81. Industry fixed effects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for whether or not the firm is a factory and for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure is public sector firms and the omitted organization consists of individual proprietorship and partnership firms. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
The omitted year is 1980-81. Industry fixed effects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for whether or not the firm is a factory and for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure is public sector firms and the omitted organization consists of individual proprietorship and partnership firms. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of significance is 6.63. Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. The omitted year is 1980-81. Industry fixed effects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for whether or not the firm is a factory and for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure is public sector firms and the omitted organization consists of individual proprietorship and partnership firms. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of significance is 6.63. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of significance is 3.78. (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of significance is 6.63. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of significance is 3.78.
